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News coverage of transportation disasters, such as the crash of Delia
Flight 1141, reveal the disaster behavior ofpassengers, flight personnel and
rescue workers. Within a mystery framework, the Flight 1141 discourse
provides clues that readers can use to construe( their own disaster behavior
awareness. The media must expand their pedagogical role beyond natural
and technological disasters and begin providing basic airplane safety behavior information.

At 9:00 a.m. on August 31. 1988. Della Flighl11 41 crashed on take·off
in DallaslFort Worth , Texas, killing 13 and leaving 94 survi vors. The fli ght,
destined for Salt Lake City, Utah. originated in Jackson, Mississippi , and
had a scheduled stop· over at DallaslFort Worth. This di saster, like Three
Mile Island, the Challenger space shuttle and Bhopal. was a spec ific kind
of tragedy: sudden, unexpected. and wholly inexplicable. Un like the other
disasters. however. the crash of Delta 1141 was one of many transpon ati on
disasters covered by the mass media and was one of th e many survivable
crashes that have occ urred throughout aviation history. Survivab le crashes
are those where passengers survive the impact of the crash . According to
the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) . lives lost in airplane
disasters deemed "survivable" are attributed to inadequate evacuati on
plans. lack of communication among parties or lack of passenger awareness
as to role expectations (Safety Study 1985).
In disaster situations the mass media serve as wartling agents. relayers
of disasterlhazard information and as educators (Disasters and the Mass
Media 1980; Quarantelli 1989; Sorenson 1983). Disaster research, how·
ever. has focused on natural di sasters, the community affected andlor the
role of the media. Studies of disaster news have centered arou nd the
inadequacies of disaster coverage and the perpetuation of disaster myths
(Blong 1984; Quaranteili 1989; Wenger and Friedman 1986). Such myths
incl ude the portrayal of helpless individuals and organi zations who are
unable to deal with the weather. or the political and econom ic policies that
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threaten them (Wilkins 1985 , 1986), Others have noted that some disasters
occur within a complex system making them hard to capture in their raw
form (Walters et aL 1989), The media, as a result, break disasters down into
simple explanations lacking in social, political and technological contellt
(Altheide 1976), During the Three Mile Island incident, for example, CBS
presented technological danger within a "nightly warning, nightly explanation" format whereas ABC presented a fable of a threatening nightmare that
the elite could not handle (Nimm o 1984, p, 64). Disasters, such as Three
Mile Island, also create rhetorical crises wherein technological reasoning
can fail to offer the communicative processes we need to solve our modem
problems (Farrell and Goodnight 1981). Others, such as the Challenger
space shuttle explosion, create situations of "' in appropriate death ' grief
reactions" for the nation and the media playa role in the social mourning
and grieving process (Goldzwig and Dionisopoulos 1986, p. 181). Finally,
some disaster news narrati ves perpetuate disaster myths (Quarantelli 1988;
Wilkins 1985, 1986) and others, such as airpl ane crash stories, encourage
"naive beliefs aboUl the safety of air travel" (Vincent et aL 1989, p. 24) .
While these studies have furthered our insight into the mass media and
di sasters much work needs to be don e. We must go beyond natural disasters
and nuclear accidents and examine the mundane, the everyday-the mass
transportation disaster. Furthermore, we need to broaden our understanding
of the di saster narrati ve. People read or watch these stories to learn about
the di saster and the people involved yet the discourse as a voi ce of disaster
educati on has not been explored. In other words, we have not asked: What
are the media telling the public about the event and the behavi ors we should
engage in during a di saster? In this paper we begin to address these issues
by focusing on the crash of Delta Flight 1141.

Disaster News as Interpretive Packages
The stewardesses or stewards, if you got them, will come out and
say: here's ho w you work your oxygen thing, th e little thing that
comes out of the ceiling. Well, probably half will just plain blow
that off, because if they fl y at all they' ve seen it all before. The little
yellow thing comes out of the ceiling and they put it on. Yet,
somehow or another, when the plane has cras hed or the passengers
become aware they are in some kind of danger, or there is a sudden
cabin deflation and fire and those things come out of the ceiling, I
bet half of them don't know what to do becau se they're panic
stricken. That's what happened in Airport , that movie. That's
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probably a pretty accurate film because news stories tell us the same
thing (Interview , September 1992).
Do news stories tell us tile same thing? Interviews, like this one, indi cate
that as we struggle to understand events we can not (and do not want to)
experience we draw upon a variety of resources including the media.
Disasters, such as airplane crashes, are abstractions for most people. Nonetheless, they become part of our common stock of knowledge through
personal, shared and mediated experience. "People construct and mOdify
their understandi ng in an active environment that is constantly offering
them images and potential schemata, suggesting how an issue is to be
understood and what should be done about it" (Gamson 1988, p. 17 1). That
the mass media tell us how to behave before, during, and after a disaster
event is a common belief (Disasters and the Mass Media 1980; Quarante lli
1988, 1989; Sorenson 1983). Yet, perhaps because the belief is so widespread , this area of disaster discourse has ne ver been studied. Disaster
researchers and practitioners alike have been acti ng like teachers without a
lesson plan; aware that something should be said but unaware of what it is
and how it might be interpreted.
We can begin by examining the 1988 crash of Delta Flight 1141. The
1141 crash was selected because it was a "typical" plane crash in that it
occurred on take-off (most crashes occur on take-off or landing) and
because there were survivors (most plane crashes are survivable) (Safety
Study 1985). The focu s is not on the most recent airplane disaster or the
largest; rather it is on the most common or "typical" di saster. The questi on
is: How was this discourse framed by the print media? That is, what did the
media tell us was the basic issue or concern of the crash? What frames
explained the di saster to those experiencing, and those far removed from,
the event? Finally, what did the discourse tell us about the safety of fl ying
and how we should behave in a disaster? By examining this issue we can
broaden our understanding of the various interpretive packages that the
media present to us in their attempt to explain such unexpected, yet wholly
common, events.
The study focu ses on the first three days of Delta 1 141 crash coverage
(August 31-September 2, 1988) by six newspapers: The Dallas Morning
News, The Dallas Times Herald, The HOltsron POSI (crash site papers), The
Clarion Ledger (Jackson, Miss.), The Jackson Daily News (flight origin
papers) and The Salt Lake Tribune (flight destinati on paper). Location of
the disaster, flight origination and flight destination determined newspaper
selection. The largest amount of coverage occurred during thi s period and
totaled in 35 I state, local and AP news stories, photographs and diagram
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stories. It should be noted that Fensch (1990) also conducted a stud y of the
1141 crash, however, he focused solely on AP reporters and their news
stories. This stud y goes beyond Fensch' s and examines the published
discourse available to the public at large.
Analyzing the continuous record of this discourse allowed us to outline
the central frames that sbaped the national and local public's acquaintance
with the crash . All media elements tied to a topic can become part of our
interpretive package or parcel that we carry about disasters. As Gamson and
ModigJiani (1989) state, "media discourse is pan of the process by which
individuals construct meaning" (p . 2). That is, each news story, each
conversation about the 1141 disaster, is much li ke the food stuffs we pack
into a grocery bag. Each item (package) in the grocery bag is different but
together the iterns form the contents of our bag and our meals. Following
Gamson (1988), we argue that the Delta 1141 disaster discourse, like other
discourse, has its own culture in which there are competing and constantly
changing packages avai lable for interpretation. The newspapers and stories
used in this study serve as an indicator of the packages people can use to
construct their interpretation of the Delta crash. Most of us would not read
all of these publications, but they were available to those who wanted to
make sense of the crash through local, national and personal discourse.

Story Frame
Determining the overall story frame, or central point of the story, allows
us to conclude the context in which safety information appeareD. "The frame
suggests what the issue is abo ut. It answers the question "what is the basic
source of controversy or concern on this issue?" (Gamson 1988, p. 165; van
Dijk 1988 ; Pan and Kosicki 1993). The 351 news stories, photographs and
diagram s covereD every topic from victim lists to stories about medi a
coverage of the crash. The ten overall story frames identified are shown in
table 1. As seen from table 2 below, the most common story frame was the
passenger story. The overall frame of "other" had a higher number of stories
but thi s was due to the mix of stories related to the crash but not to the study.
Table 2 totals to more than 351 stories because some stories had two key
story frames (e.g., Passenger Story and Accident Crash).

A viation Safety Themes
Because disaster news narratives can serve as a voice for disaster
education we looked fortext that related to issues of aviation safety. Federal
Aviation Administration and Nati onal Transportation Safery Board studies,
the Sioux City , Iowa, crash in 1989, and our research on respondent
understanding of aviation safety , serveD as a foundati on for theme devel-
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Table 1. Transportation Disaster Story Frames
Frame
Accident/Crash

Description
The crash event itself; cras h recap

Crash Site Rescue

Rescue efforts at the crash site

Crash Site Plane

Examinati on/in vestigation of the plane

Passenger Stories

Passengers' experiences, their lives, etc.

Victim Stories

Those who died in crash; victim li sts

Rescue Workers

Rescue worker trai ning , work prior to, or
during, the crash

Other Aid

Crash site community stories; witnesses;
hospitals; hotels; aid to passengers.
victims, families

Previous Crash Stories

Stories about previous plane crashes

Op/Ed
Other

Articles about the crash on Op/Ed page
Crash stories that did not fit other categories

Table 2. Overall Story Frames
Frame
Passenger Story

70 (24P/6D )*

No. Stories

Crash Si te Plane

49 (22P/9D )

Rescue Warkers

30 (18P)

Accident/Crash

26 (l 3P/I D)

Other Aid

26 OP/ l D)

Previous Crashes

25 (5PIl D)

Victi m Story

24 (SP)

Crash Site Rescue

12 (9P)

Op/Ed

6 (OP/OD)

Other

107 ( 16P/9D )

*p = photograph; D - diagram
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opmen!. Aviation safety discou rse involves four key themes: passenger
safety, fli ght personnel safety , plane safety and rescue. Briefly, passenger
safety themes are references to such activities as using seat belts, storing
items on board the plane, opening emergency exits, and/or helping others
exit the plane. "Many of the passengers, however, reportedl y escaped the
wreckage on their own, many of them through the emergency exits. Some,
however, had trouble with the doors" (Pusey 1988, p. 1) is a good example.
Flight personnel safety themes are references to pilot or fli ght attendant
(raining, years fl ying, age, and/or activities after the crash. "He did not get
the proper readi ngs from one of his engines. He decided to go back to the
gate ... " (Gamboa 1988, p. 1) is a flight safety statement. Plane safety
themes are references to the probable cause of the crash , to meeting industry
standards, and/or to the safety of similar airplanes. An example is : "Three
years ago, a Delta L-1011 crashed at the same airport ... " (Shannon 1988 ,
p. 2). Finall y, rescue themes are references to rescue personnel training,
availability to victims and/or rescue actions. For example, "D-FW airport
rescuerS arrived within three minutes after the jet went down" (Kerr and
Laws 1988, p. 14) is a rescue theme.
In addition to full sentences, we identified phrases, lexical meanings,
metaphors, si miles, and so on. To provide a sense of how prevalent safety
themes are within the news discourse we counted the number of paragraphs
where safety tbeme references were found. Of the 35 1 stories studied 43
percent were found to also contain at least one aviation safety theme. A total
of 613 paragraphs were identifi ed as safety theme paragraphs: 34 percent
were passengers themes, 24 percent were flight safety, 29 percent were
plane safety and] 4 percent were rescue safety themes. As can be seen from
table 3 below, some safety themes were stronger than others but together
they serve as a voice of disaster education.
Story frames , more often than not, contained a mixture of all aviation
themes. The four strongest story frames, and the aviation themes that
appeared, are discussed below.

Reading the Delta 1141 Story
An airplane crash disrupts the normal fabri c of everyday life and everything we know and trust ends or is severely jarred. Wh iIe this is especially
true for those directly affected by the crash, it is also true for those of us
who read about the crash. At a very basic level, airplane crashes remind us
that things go wrong and we can die. The Delta 1141 news stories served
as a constant reminder of thi s fact as they worked to frame the disaster as a
mystery to be so lved. By mystery I mean an "unknown." The mystery of
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Table 3. Safety Themes within Story Frames
Story Frame
Passenger

TP*

Passenger Flight

Plane

Rescue
11

137
16

25
39

8

I

Accident/Crash

703
397
285
360

38

9

24
45
2
15

Other Aid

281

5
0
2
14
2
20

0

1

20

8

7
3

8

11

12
2
7

Crash Site Plane
Rescue Workers

Previous Crash
Victims
Crash Rescue
Op/Ed
Other

242
253
107
62
1431

4
3

67

72

29
10

0

"'TP::: Total story paragraph s; lheme numbers refer to paragraphs containing a safety
theme reference for that category.

the crash is, after all, a real one; for during the first three days (and often
months) after the crash both the cause of the accident, and how passengers
survived the crash , remains unknown. The news stories reflect thi s fact in
both a real and lite rary sense by reporting the facts of the crash , and tales
of passe nger survi val, within a predictable dramatic fram ework of setting
(crash site), actors (pi lot, passengers, FAA officialS), plotts), and a "to-becontinued" ending. The ending helps to establish a mystery framework like
that in the game of Clue (e.g., was it Colonel Mustard with the candle stick
in the library?). The use of the mystery frame is not intended to be a fonnal
typology but rather a means of ordering my interpretation of the news stories
(Goffman 1959, 1974; Young 1990).
A Mystery is Established: Accident/Crash Stories
Accident/crash stories are usuall y the lead stories on the first day of
coverage and focus primarily on piecing together what happened and why.
Ult imately, the story frame serves primarily as a prelude, or introduction,
to the other Delta 1141 stories. The lead story in the Dallas Morning News
on September 1, is a good example. The article "Piecing together the
tragedy" (Minutaglio and Jacobson 1988, p. lA) retells the story of the c rash
c hronologically, beginning with a depiction of the scene before the crash
("a beautiful morning for a flight") as being normal and routine. This scene
changes "i n just a few minutes" to "a harrowing experience of fear, courage
and unanswered questions. " These stories are typically the first ones pub-
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Iished when infonnation is at its thinnest; wh en little is known about the
exact number of survi vors (if any); and even less is known about the cause
of the crash. Because of these conditions a to-be-c ontinued ending to the
story is inevitable and works to establi sh the mystery both explicitly and
implicitl y. Used in the retelling of the event are speculations by unnamed
sources ("fire in the left engine"), eyewitness and passenger accoun ts of the
crash ("the least injured climbed out on their own") (Makovy 1988, p. Al),
and secondary information about past airline and airport disasters (Delta
191 crash; American DelO aborted takeoff). The Delta 1141 discourse
provides readers with clues to the mystery of the crash and passenger
survival through descriptions of the plane ("i t bu rst into flames"), of
passenger behavi ors ("we jumped on the wing"), of possible villains (pilot,
mechanic, Mother Nature) and, fin al!y, the promise of a soluti on to the
mystery (NTSB "would remain at the scene") (Pego 1988 , pp. I, 2). The
promise to sol ve the mystery continues in the other story frames, especially
the Crash Site Pl ane Stories. Even more importan tl y, the aviation themes
(passenger, fli ght personnel, plane and rescue safety) appeared repeatedly
throughout the narratives. The Passenger stories, for example, provide the
strongest sense of what it would be like to survive a crash and then escape
the airplane.
A Struggle for Survival: Passenger Stories
Passenger stories concentrated on the Delta 1141 survi vors, al lowing the
reader to "experience" the crash through the retelling of the event. Passengers' thoughts and behavior, before and after the crash, give the reader a
composite view of the crash and what it wou ld be like to survive and to
escape the plane.
Within this retelling of experiences the passenger safety theme was the
strongest. Phrases such as "You were just looking for a way to get out of
tbe plane and hope you weren't going to die" or "Thompson saw someone
struggling to pry open the emergency hatch ... " conveyed not only what was
happening but the steps that people took to escape the plane. Found within
pictures and phrases were the actions Delta 1141 passengers had to take, or
wanted to take, during the event. These phrases and images conveyed what
passengers did (escape); the problems they meet with (locked doors); whom
they re lied on and the various ways they responded to the crash. All of these
stories showed that most of the passengers escaped the wreckage on their
own; some throug h holes in the fu selage, others through the emergency
exits. "On their own, most of the survivors had fled the plane by the time
emergency workers arrived, officials said" (Tomaso and Crawford 1988, p.
27).
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Glim and hi s wife released their seat be lts and made their way to
the first class section, but they couldn't get out. ... [Bob Jones] was
in Seat 4C , just behind the emergency exit on the right side of the
plane .... People were panicked, but nobody was pushing or shov ing," he said. "It was every man for himself. None of the crew came
on the public address system to give any information about what
was happening or ho w to get off the plane" .' [Jerry Galloway]
moved toward the back of the plane , where the flames were, to help
a woman who seemed to be struggling with her seat belt. She
escaped without his aid, so he moved to the front of the plane and
helped people climb th rough the hole in the fu selage (Woolley
1988a, p. 1, 18).
Some passenger safety statements also include plane safety or fli ght
safety themes. For example, "The stewardess began screaming. 'Get off'
Get off" survivors told him, and ' instincts took over and they followed
orders'" (Tomaso and Crawford 1988, p. 27). Refe rences within the stories
to flight personnel, other than the pilot, are rare but this is a good example
of flight personne l providing the guidance most passengers seem to expect
after a plane crash. It also illustrates the kind of image that most airlines
wish to convey; that is, the sense that if there is a crash, there will be
someone to help you and guide you (usuall y a flight attendant). Thi s appears
to be an image most passengers carry with them (Safety Study 1985). It is,
however, inaccurate, for flight attendant survival is no more insured than
passenger survival.
The statement: "Bettes said he was in seat 19A, a window seat one row
in front of an emergency exit" (Pusey 1988 , p. 1) is a good example of the
passenger and plane safety theme. The statement conveys two i mages: First,
the plane does provide avenues of escape and one of the survi vors sat near
this avenue. Second, for hislher own survival, it would be wise for the
passenger to sit near an exit. This corresponds to a popular belief, by many
who fl y, that one pan of an airplane is safer than another. Encouraging this
belief further are plane safety statements such as the follo wing: "NTSB
offi cials said they planned to examine the seating assignments to see if a
pattern of survivability emerges. Dr. Nizam Peerwani , Tarrant County's
medical examiner said , however, that all of the victims had been seated in
the rear of the plane" (Pusey 1988, p. 14).
The story by Minutaglio and Jacobson ( 1988) ends with the quote: "I'm
a firm believerthat when it' s a man' s time to go, it's his time .... It wasn' t
my time." The idea thi s imparts is that there is little one can do to prevent
these events from happening and if caught in such a situation, whether you
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survive is a matter of luck or destiny. NTSB research shows that this is not
the case; that a passenger's kno wledge of safety practices and procedures
helps to ensure hislher life, as weU as the lives of thei r fellow passengers.
Despite the underlying tone of fatalism within these stories, there is another
message-that of self-help.
Christensen said she was sitting next to an exit door, and after the
crash "I pulled it open but it was on fire. The flames just jumped
in. "

... Christensen said she ran across the aisle of the Boeing 727
and took the sizable jump down to what seemed like very unsafe
ground (Flood 1988, p. 14).
Pictures of survivors , and images of passengers sliding down wings,
finding exits (through doors or gaping holes) and aiding others, convey the
idea that passengers respond to the situation and do not wait for the flight
attendants or rescue personnel to assist them. Thi s is a true-to life image of
what these situations require, but it is not one the airlines want you to have
nor is it one many passengers themselves ha ve (Safety Study 1985 ).
The Plot Thickens: Crash Site Plane Stories
Crash site airplane stories focus on the plane itself, the wreckage, the
crash investigation, comparisons with similar models or accidents, and the
airplane's history. While the mystery theme is, at least, implicitly present
in all of the stories, it is especially strong in these stories because they focu s
on the crash and a search for an explanation. Mixed with images of NTSB
investigators inspecting the crash and speculating as to the cause of the crash
(trying to solve the mystery). are reports of previous crashes involving
similar planes, with similar engines. Not surprisingly, also within these
stories are the plane safety and fli ght safety themes.
Was it the plane? Plane safety themes focu s on all aspects of the crash
(cause, investigation, history) but in the Delta 1141 crash they centered
primaril y on the "plane's engines and wing flaps ." References to history of
either the 727s Of the engine on these planes framed much of the dialog. As
the sample below highlights, these stories begin with a statement that the
Delta 1141 plane was a "common and nonnally safe transport." The story
continues by citing previous problems and crashes and concludes with the
somewhat reassuring statement that, again , only minor problems have
occurred throughout the plane's history.
The plane was a Boeing 727 -200, a commonly used aircraft with a
good safety record and powered by engines found on two thirds of
the nation 's commercial jets. . The jet was equipped with two
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versions of the JT8D, which many industry experts considered a
reliable power plant . ... In August 1985 , a JT8D engine on a British
AirtoUfS Boeing 737 burst open when the jet was on its takeoff roll
at Manchester, England, causing the jet to catch ftre .... The
Milwaukee crash in September 1985 involved problems with spacers in the turbines of a different version of the JT8D engine on a
Midwest Express DC-9. The aircraft used for Flight 1141 had had
only minor problems in the last five years, FAA reports show
(Garcia 1988, p. 28)
The theme also focuses on where surviving passengers or flight personnel sat or escaped from , and where the victims died. The following statement about flight attendant Dixie Dunn, illustrates this point. "But
Wednesday, she was training a junior employee in first-class, so Dunn was
sitting in the back jump seat of Flight 14]] to service the rear of the p lane,
where 11 of the 13 fatali ties were killed by flames and smoke" (Needham
1988, p. 16). The next example indicates that seating can determine your
fate bullhere is no guarantee.
Edmond and Marian Fadal , like their traveling companions Frank
and Jean Nix, gave no thought to where they would sit during Delta
Flight 1141. But those seat assignments defined who lived and who
died .... They arranged in advance to sit together-Jean Nix in
window seat20A, her husband next to her, Edmond Fadal, 63, took
the aisle seat and wife Marian 65, sat ju st across the isle .... [After
the crash] Edmond Fadal and the Nixs unfastened their seat belts
and tumbled from the plane [Mrs. Fadal died] (Zamichow 1988, p.
16)
The Dallas Times Herald, like the other papers, used diagrams to help
tell the story of this crash. The diagram, "Cross-Section of Flight 1141 "
(Dallas Times Herald 1988, p. B5), for example. illustrated the damage to
the plane itself, the location and status of emergency exits (open or closed) ,
as well as the victims' locations. Such diagrams locate for the reader areas
of damage to the plane, as well as areas where passengers lived and died
and, like the above statements, indicate for the reader that some areas of the
plane are safer than others.
Was it the crew? The mystery theme is refue led again, within crash site
plane stories, by references to previous crashes caused by pilot error and
speculations as to the role the flight crew or pilot in thi s crash. These
speCUlations, however, also promote flight safety themes by focusing on
the flight crew's and pilot's years of experience and training; the actions
the pilot took just before the plane crash ; as well as actions other pilots had
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take n in crashes of a similar nature. References to the pilot's record,
personality or temperament and age are especially common, as are referenCeS to flight crew training and experti se.
Capt. Larry Davis is a calm man. He's very thoughtful. He doesn' l
panic. . Davis, 48, has at least 2 J years of flyin g servi ce. He has
no history of accidents or safety violations (Woolley 1988b, p. J 8).
Also reported were the onboard annoutlcements the pilot or the flight
crew made about upcoming events or appropriate actions (e.g., keep calm ),
and their heroic actions after the crash (escaping, aiding others, etc.).
Suddenly in the smoky darkness, he realized that the plane' s pilot
was buried under several feet of metal and debris. And, miraculously, the pilot was cal mly, slowly guiding his passengers while
he was pinned down: "S low down, watch your step," the pilot said
(Minutaglio and Jacobson 1988, p. 15A).
Not all the fli ght safety themes, however, were positi ve or supportive of
the fl ight crew, or Delta Airlines. Newspapers reviewed the safety hi story
of both Delta and DfFW International Airport and found room for improvement. The HOllston Post, in particular, noted the problems that Delta had
had in the past (at the same time it also noted Delta's overall reputation).
The Delta Jet cras h at Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport
Wednesday eerily resembled the Delta L-J 0 11 smashup at the same
airport precisely three years ago last month, rai sing questions about
the air carrier' s safety record .... [Berry] said the carrier's overall
record is "quite good." Some industry analysts agreed, saying Delta
has a reputation of a well-run, safe and finan cially secure airline .
. But Baron, head of the New York-based air safety group, cited
a series of problems that have plagued Delta, including an instance
last Jul y when the crew of a Delta jet shut down two engines, told
the passengers to get ready to crash and nearly caused the plane to
plunge into the Pacific Ocean off California. There was nothing
mechanically wrong wi th the plane (Loddeke 1988, p. 13).
Help: Rescue Worker Stories
Finally, the rescue worker stories center on rescue personnel such as
paramedics, firemen and clergy. They focus on rescue efforts at the scene
of the crash as well as at the hospital, crash site shelter and morgue. Most
of the rescue im ages, however, deal with how fast the emergency personnel
responded, the actions they took upon arri val, and other rescue or aid efforts.
Robert Seadore, with the department of public safety at D/FW
Airport, received an Alert 3 signal close to 9 a. m.
In three
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minutes, Seadore and other department officers were the first
paramedics on the scene (Minutaglio and Jacobson 1988, p. 15A).
Photographs complimented these images by depicting rescue workers
tending survivors , priests and ministers providing comfort and last rites, as
well as fire fighters and medics transporting survi vors to area hospitals.
These images convey the sense that help is available and people will be
there to tend to you, once yo u get off the plane . This is not to say . however,
that those trapped, injured, or unable to escape were wi thout aid.
Taylor said he and other DPS offi cers arri ved at the scene abo ut
three minutes after the crash. He entered the plane through the
passenger door and, as the plane continued to burn and fill with
smoke, Taylor and the other rescue workers found Da vis unab le to
move and complaining of back pain (Brumley 1988, p. 29).
Along with the speed at which rescuers responded to the crash were
references to learning from previous crashes at the DallaslFort Worth
Airport. The August 1985 Delta 191 crash, for example, provided a training
ground, as well as a guide, for the 1141 rescue efforts.
Within minutes after Wednesday morning' s crash, Delta Air Lines
officials began applying lessons they learned from the crash of
Delta Flight 191 ... (Van Zelfdon 1988, p. B2).
Seadore credited the generally quick rescue action to lessons
learned from the 1985 crash of De lta 191 (Pu sey 1988, p. 14).
Even as emergency crews arrived, clergymen of several denominati ons began heading for the airport. Many had counseled relatives
of victims of Delta Fli ght 19 1 (Sunde 1988, p. 21).

ImpLications
Airplane cras hes shake the peaceful foundation of our everyday life. The
resulling news sto ries are an interesting mix of voyeurism, affirmation and
reassurance about the safelY of flying and transportation . The sto ries are
voyeuristic because they fulfill our hidden desires to know about the
grotesque detai ls of life, death and mutilation . We read how the plane
tumbled, crashed and burned ; how some died, their bodies found near a
partially opened but jammed exit and how others survived and escaped.
Survivor stories, told in detail , reveal their destination, their thoughts as the
plane crashed, and their actions as they escaped.
The stories are affirming and reassuring because, against a backdrop of
drama, they speak of a tradition of strong planes and flight crews. Like the
captain of a ship, the pilot was the last off the plane and despite severe
injuries guided passengers though the escape hatch. We also learn the plane
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was a model of durability and , wi th the excepti on of a few problems, a safe
one. In other words, the plane was okay when it left its place of origin and
was historicall y safe. But somethi ng went very wrong. Something went
wrong, when the pilot was good, the plane was strong, and the weather was
fair. A mystery is established in real life and in the newspapers. Stories note
repeatedly that investigators are searching for clues and "will not speculate
as to the cause of the crash." Yet, within those same stories are further
conjectures as to the crash's cause. The mystery is refueled as the story
reassures uS that someone is trying to solve it.
The study reveals that disaster news narratives contain more than inaccuracies, disaster myth s and a means for grieving. The culture of airplane
disaster discourse also tell s us what to expect when a plane crashes and what
we might do if we are in a plane crash. Also incl uded are images of normalcy
tragically disrupted by the crash as well as images of relief personnel and
aviati on officials working to restore order. Presented as a breakdown in our
social order, the disaster conveys a clear sense that rescue workers restore
order in the short-term and aviation officials restore it for the long-term .
In short, airplane crashes, such as Delta 1141 , re mind us that the system
can fail and people die. Yet, the airplane di saster news stories reassure
readers because authorities figures , such as the FAA, NTSB and the airlines,
are depicted as being in command . Vincent, Crow and Davis ( J 989) argue
that this news frame is "responsible" because it protects the public from
being "needlessly" alarmed. On the other hand , it also encourage the
perpetuation of disaster myths; encourages the public's belief that flying is
safe and there is little they can do about their own safety; and encourages
the belief th at authorities are in control and are insuring public safety when,
in fact, thi s may not be happening at all. This "faith" in the FAA and the
NTSB and the ritual of investigation into the "mystery" of the crash may
ac tually help to preserve the status quo. News stories do not challenge the
institutional process but merely give the reader a sense th at aviation officials
have command of the system even when it is demonstrating failure. The
discourse, then, is ultimately hegemonic.
This is especially true when one considers the fact that despite their
protests to the contrary, the airline industry does not want the public to be
aware of the fact that when a di saster does happen passengers will most
likely have to respond on their own. The airlines act ively encourage the
belief that airline personnel will be there to assist passengers in a disaster
and subtly encourage the belief that the safety bri efings, and the information
contai ned therein, will not be needed (Safety Study 1985). Yet, NTSB
studies have shown that fli ght crew survival is no more insured than
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passengers' and most passenger deaths are not aUributable to the cras h itse lf
but rather to passengers' lack of familiarity with safety procedu res leading
to their in ability to escape the plane (Safety Study J 985). In other words,
passengers can achieve some control over their fate if they know what to
do and are willing and able to take acti on.
While it is clear that disaster news narrati ves contain information that
readers can draw upon to shape their own disaster behavior awareness,
several issues and questions remain. The fi rs t issue is the perception of ri sk.
Airplane crashes have several features which separate them from other
"types" of disasters-including unique risk perception characteristics (as
outlined by Fischhoff et al. 198 1). Flyi ng, for example, is perceived by the
public to be more dangerous and inherentl y deadly than driving a car; in
part, because people fl ying on airplanes often lack the false sense of security
and control that they feel when driving a car; and in part, because non-survivable airplane cras hes receive more visible and sensational treatment by
the media (Fi schhoff et al. 198 1; Gamer 1992) . In addition, the perceived
high risk of fl ying is tempered by the perceived "need" to fl y and the beli ef
that airplane crash responsibility, response and survival lies solely with
aviation offici als (FAA , NTSB , the airline industry).
The second issue, and first question , is who is responsible for educating
the public about airplane safety issues? For the most part thi s issue remains
outside the jurisdiction of state, county and municipal emergency managers.
On the fede ral level, the FAA and NTSB 's context for managing airplane
crashes di ffers from that for managing most techn ologi cal and natural
di sasters. Here the focus is on "response" by aviati on offi cials afterthe crash
happens; not on disaster preparation or mitigation . The di saster preparati on
and mitigation practices that do occur focu s primarily on airplane technology and fli ght personnel training. Worthy areas to be sure but the emphasis
is on the prevention of something that can not always be prevented. In all
three cases (preparation, mitigation and response), the role of the public at
risk is limited. There is little the public can do it prevent a crash and random
factors determine survi val so the public 's role consists mostly of getting out
of the airplane if they survive impact. This one act requires preflight safety
and adaptive behavior preparation; a need the FAA recognizes by their
regulation that airlines deli ver this information, in the form of safety
briefings, to on-board passengers by "trained flight personnel. " Yet, these
individuals are not emergency managers and as studies by the NTSB show
(Safety Study 1985) in-flight safety presentations and skills are hi ghly
variable across flights and members of the public at risk. The end result is
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no one is formally in charge of educating the public abolll risks, vulnerabilities, safety responses on airplanes in a systematic and effective way.
This leads to question two: Does the mass media have an obligation to
educate people about transportation disasters, floods, earthquakes and other
potentially dangerous situations" The answer is yes from at least four
vantage points. First, because that is ultimately what media do--they
educate the public about local , national and international events-be they
polities or disasters. Second, the nature of the intended audience is one they
have. at least historically, been able to reach fairly well. Unlike in the case
of floods, volcanoes, or nuclear power plants, the "threatened" population
lacks clearly defined geographic parameters. Technically, everyone who
flies is vulnerable to airplane crashes; the result being that the audience in
"need" of airplane safety information is a mass audience that is ill defined
at best. Third, the lack of clear responsibility for communicating aviati on
safety information, coupled with the vaguely defined audience, presents a
formula that inevitably leads to the mass media doing a better job than the
current agencies, especially since relatively few of them feel that they have
a specific charge or duty to educate the public about this issue. Finally, the
media already serve as disaster warning agents (e.g., Emergency Broadcast
System) for natural disasters and many have a "disaster plan ," developed
in conjuncti on with local e mergency planning boards (Carter 1980); providing educational programs on disasterlhazardlrisk mitigation and preparedness (Kreps 1980, p. 36). The media already provides earthquake and
tornado preparation guides, they could also provide their readers with
transportation disaster guides. This does not mean that the media should
have a "disaster plan" for transportation disaster evacuations. It does,
however, mean that editors should be aware of their pedagogical role and
provide the public with basic airplane safety behavior information (exit
locations, crash positions, etc.). It also means that an effective, proactive,
partnership would need to be developed between the FAA or NTSB and the
media to ensure presentation of the most accurate and understandable
information needed.
This call, however, raises another issue; the reluctance of the transportation industry to acknowledge disasters and the need for preparation. As
Molotch and Lester (1974) observed , accidents foster "revelations which
are otherwise deliberately obfuscated" and they provide us wi th "an important resource for learning about" events of which economic in stitutions
wo uld rather have us remain unaware (p. 109). News coverage of airplane
crashes results in the periodic reminders that flying is potentially unsafe;
the aviation industry system is not perfect; and that people can die if they
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fly. These reminders usually have short term consequences for not only the
airlines (lost revenue) but also for related entertainment and travel industries (such as ho te ls, car rental age ncies, etc .). Indeed, some may worry that
media discussion of plane safety behavior issues cou ld create the impression
that air travel is always un safe; thereby further threatening the larger
political economy for which the media are also responsible (Gans 1980).
Wh ile such concerns are valid, they tend to promote inaction rather than
action. The media do not create the disasters, they report them. When they
do report them they can be careful about the passenger behavior repo rted
and they can re mind readers that survival is possible but they need to learn
certain adapti ve be haviors. This would not stop people from fl ying (Safety
Study, 1985) and would save li ves. As the latest round of crashes reminds
us, planes and trains are potentially unsafe; but it is equally important to
recognize that mass tran sit use will inc rease and passengers need to be told
clearly and repeatedly how to respond to a di saster. This would probably
not please the industry , but it would the rest of us who must ride on the
wings and rai Is of fate.
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